John Rawls. Uzasadnienie, sprawiedliwość i rozum publiczny: Nr 5(2019)

Autorzy

Krzysztof Kędziora
Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Filozoficzno-Historyczny, Instytut Filozofii, Katedra Etyki
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4224-9544

Słowa kluczowe:

teoria sprawiedliwości, filozofia polityczna, kontraktualizm, konstruktywizm, zasady sprawiedliwości, John Rawls

Streszczenie

Teoria sprawiedliwości Johna Rawlsa, podobnie jak i jego filozofia polityki, nie są łatwe do intelektualnego przyswojenia. Mimo że był filozofem amerykańskim i ewidentnie bliska była mu anglosaska tradycja analityczna w filozofii, która odznacza się dążeniem do jasności stylu i ogólnej klarowności intelektualnej, to jednak czytelnik jego Teorii sprawiedliwości i w nieco mniejszej mierze innych prac z pewnością nie ma łatwego zadania. Śledzenie meandrów myśli Rawlsa jest bowiem trudne i wymaga wielkiej koncentracji. W tym sensie wprowadzenie do jego teorii sprawiedliwości i filozofii polityki to rzecz z pewnością bardzo potrzebna, więc projekt Krzysztofa Kędziory należy przywitać z radością. Jego wykonanie także budzi szacunek i uznanie.

Z recenzji prof. Andrzeja Szahaja

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