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O B L I C Z A W O J N Y

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MOBILISATION OF THE ARMIES OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH BEFORE THE BATTLE OF PEREYASLAV IN 1630

Summary. This article outlines the mobilisation efforts made by both the Royal and the Hetman's Chancellery with the aim of concentrating the maximum armed forces of the Crown army to suppress the uprising of the Zaporozhian Host under the command of Taras Fedorovych and Anton But. Particular aspects of the mobilisation were considered, such as the methodology of its implementation with regard to units of the so-called 'quarter' army (Polish: *wojsko kwarciane*), foreign troops, private cavalry banners, separate banners of the Lithuanian army, and the remnants of the Zaporozhian Host that remained loyal to the Commonwealth.

Based on various published and archival sources (registers of army levies, official and private letters, narrative texts, etc.), the geography and chronology of the movement of the Commonwealth army units during this mobilisation, their composition, numbers, and the names of their commanders have been established as far as possible.

Particular attention was paid to aspects of the mobilisation of the private cavalry banners of the local magnates from the Zbaraski, Zasławski-Ostrogski, and Zamoyski families, which have been little studied by historians so far, although soon after their mobilisation provided significant support for the quarter army. The beginning of the long and difficult mobilisation of a foreign regiment under the command of Jakub Butler and the Denhoff brothers and the preparation of the Crown artillery for the campaign are also discussed.

The research also helped to conclude that after the first stages of mobilisation before the Battle of Pereyaslav, Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski had sufficient forces (in terms of quality and numbers) to stop the main part of the insurgents' army and to attempt to engage the enemy in gruelling battles in open field.

Keywords: Cossack Uprising in 1630, Zaporozhian Host, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Stanisław Koniecpolski, Taras Fedorovych, military mobilisation

Introduction

The Cossack uprising of 1630 was caused by a number of complicated processes within the Zaporozhian Cossack milieu, such as the deliberate breach of the conditions of the Treaty of Kurukove of 1625 due to the authorities of the Commonwealth encouraging the Zaporozhians to take part in the civil wars in the Crimea and some internal unresolved contradictions within the Kurukove commission, which divided the Zaporozhian Host into two separate organisations – a registered army subordinated to the Field Crown Hetman, and numerous detachments of ‘non-registered’ and ‘de-registered’ (ex-registered army soldiers) Cossack population and opposition against the older register, residing in Zaporozhzhia.

Stefan Chmielecki, the Kyiv voivode in charge of Cossack politics, in order to suppress the rebellion in Zaporozhzhia, worked out and began to implement a plan to carry out an inspection of the registered regiments and to prepare a punitive expedition of the registry army to Zaporozhzhia and its logistic blockade. As a result of the threat from the Tatars, Chmielecki’s plan was not executed in time. The lawlessness of the soldiers of the Prussian army, deployed there in the number of at least 25 cavalry banners, which had not been paid for their service during the recent war with Sweden, further intensified the crisis that ensued in Ukraine in the winter of 1629/1630.

With the onset of spring thaws at the end of March, a Cossack army of several thousand men arrived in the Kyiv region from Zaporozhzhia under the command of Taras Fedorovych, an experienced commander and veteran of various campaigns. On 3 April, the rebels bloodily dealt with the leaders of the registry army, after which they began an open armed conflict with the Crown banners deployed in the Dnieper Ukraine. The number of the uprising participants began to grow dramatically, as a result of which their forces grew to 30 000–40 000 people. The uprising had begun for good.

First mobilisations

On 4 April – Easter Sunday – the first major conflict took place between the Crown army and the insurgents. By this time, there had been some concentration of forces (probably through so-called ‘cards,’ messages that were circulated between mid-tier officers) of Crown army units stationed in the Dnieper

Ukraine (Polish: *Naddnieprze*) around Korsun. The choice of this town as the centre of defence for the Crown troops against the insurgents seems rather strange. According to a contemporary account, “There is no castle or manor of HRH in this town, only a fortified settlement (...). This town has no artillery.” At first glance, it may also appear that the enemy arrived unexpectedly quickly. The fact that there were several such gathering points was reported by Andrzej Kościa-Zbirohowski in his diary, who noted that already on 18 March “a company arrived from Left-bank Ukraine (Polish: *Zadnieprze*)” in Kyiv, and under the date of 2 April, i.e., 2 days before the battle of Korsun, recorded that a council of the Crown army was held ‘on safety from the Cossacks’ in Kyiv.¹ As we can see, the arrival of Fedorovych and the insurgents in Kyiv land could not have been a complete surprise for the Crown troops.

The group of Crown units in Korsun consisted of three Cossack banners that nominally comprised 100 horses each: the rittmeister Andrzej Śladkowski of Marcin Kazanowski’s regiment, and Samuel Łaszcz and Jan Bąk-Lanckoroński of Mikołaj Potocki’s regiment.² The rittmeisters themselves did not accompany these troops. About 1500–2000 registered Cossacks joined the Crown soldiers. We suppose the above-mentioned troops concentrated the majority of the members of two or three registered regiments (because this is how registered Cossacks would normally behave in the 1630s in similar situations, i.e., internal disagreements usually resulted in the Cossacks dividing into separate regiments). The gathering of the Crown army and the registered regiments was defeated by the insurgents in a battle near Korsun.

¹ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджєя Кості-Збіроховського, товариши козацької хоругви коронного війська (фрагменти за 18 листопада 1629 р. – 17 червня 1630 р.), [in:] Проект «Україна». Повстання Війська Запорозького 1630 року. Документи і матеріали, ed. T. KOVALETS, Харків 2017, p. 311.*

² *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 252; Повідомлення „Хроніки” Павла Пясецького, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 305; Анонімний лист про козацьке повстання..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 269. In some sources we find references to two banners, vide: *Лист королівського секретаря Якуба Заджіка до Т. Замойського (фрагмент), із Варшави 1630, квітня 16, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 238. Also, at the end of April there were rumours in Warsaw that these were hussar banners, vide: Повідомлення інформатора Йогана Хемніца для невідомих осіб у Гданську (фрагменти), із Варшави, 1630, квітня 20, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 154.**

The beginning of the mobilisation of the main forces

The radical mood and actions of the insurgents came as quite a surprise to the soldiers of the Crown army and, above all, its commander, Field Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, who was staying in Bar. He must have learnt about the events in Korsun from the messengers sent by registered Cossacks who arrived 2–3 days later, having travelled approximately 400 km.³

The main strategic imperative of the enraged Koniecpolski was quick, immediate action to suppress the uprising with armed forces,⁴ which also determined how the mobilisation of the Crown troops was to be carried out. In a very short time, in order to gather together the defeated units and carry out reconnaissance, Samuel Łaszcz, the Crown rittmeister and outstanding *zagończyk* (commander of borderland mobile units), was sent at the head of 12 ‘quarter’ army banners and several of his private cavalry units, comprising up to several thousand cavalry men, which must have been stationed nearby in Podolia. Łaszcz followed the route from Kyiv to Korsun, stopping the survivors – groups of soldiers and registered Cossacks – and turning them back to Bar.⁵

Timing and methodology of mobilisation

It is not known when the mobilisation of the main forces of the Crown army actually began. As we have already mentioned, certain groups of cavalry banners assembled in individual towns as early as the first days of April, while their final concentration was set by Koniecpolski’s orders probably in the second week of April. The Hetman’s chancellery sent *universals* (official commands) to the various units on duty with orders to come to Bar on the appointed dates. Private letters with requests to come to the assistance of the Crown army were sent to specific local magnates that maintained their own large armed forces. Also, widespread calls were addressed to the local nobility inviting them to take part in the expedition against the Cossacks as volunteers.

³ Виступ С. Конєцпольського на вальному сеймі (регести), [Б. д. — 1631, початок], [б. м. – Варшава], [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 189.

⁴ Лист С. Конєцпольського до Зигмунта III, 1630, квітня 17, із Бару, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 239.

⁵ Повідомлення щоденника Владислава Халецького, товариша гусарської хоругви коронного війська (регести, фрагменти за 4 квітня – 8 червня 1630 р.), [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 222.

Capacity and accounts of the first phase of mobilisation

It is difficult to ascertain the number of Crown units available to the Field Hetman at the beginning of the campaign. According to some information, up to 8000 soldiers were stationed in Ukraine at that time,⁶ but we very much doubt such large numbers. The gathering of forces was carried out in an exceptionally short time, in less than two weeks. On 16 April Koniecpolski set off from Bar to the north-east. In his letter to the king, he also mentioned the artillery, informing that he had taken only the 'lighter cannon' with him, and ordered the rest of the artillery to wait for the arrival of the wagons. The dragoons, or at least some of their units, also did not accompany him, and some "cavalry banners were left behind."⁷ According to information from an unknown Lviv informant of the Radziwiłłs, at the beginning of the campaign the Field Hetman of the Crown had a 'quarter' army comprising "four thousand cavalry and several hundred infantry."⁸

Koniecpolski was also worried that the Tatars, with whom the Cossacks had agreements of mutual assistance,⁹ might join the uprising. For this reason, despite great problems associated with the gathering of the army, he was forced to send a corps under the command of Adam Kalinowski, starost of Bratslav, to the borderland "to discourage pagan incursions;"¹⁰ these forces could have comprised up to 2000 soldiers (or at least this number was actively rumoured).¹¹

In almost every military campaign of the time, the private armies of the magnates and the numerous local nobility who joined the army (and often pursued their own goals), were a very important force. The mechanism for sending letters to the magnates and nobility of the Ukrainian provinces, and also of Volhynia

⁶ М. Антонович, *Переяславська кампанія 1630 р.*, Prague 1944, pp. 17–19.

⁷ Лист С. Конєцпольського до Зигмунта III, 1630, квітня 17, із Бару, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 239.

⁸ *Анонімний лист про козацьке повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 269.

⁹ For more on Cossack-Tatar relations in this period *vide*: Т. КОВАЛЕЦЬ, „*Kozak, Tatar, dwa bratanki, i do szabli, i do szklanki*”... *Співпраця Запорозжся і Криму у повстаннях 20–30 х років XVII ст. в Україні*, [in:] „*Dialectica necesităţii şi libertăţii în educaţie*”, *conferinţă ştiinţifică internaţională (2016; Chişinău)*, 30 martie – 1 aprilie 2016, Chişinău, ed. V. CONSTANTINOV *et al.*, Kishinev 2016, pp. 161–185.

¹⁰ Лист С. Конєцпольського до Зигмунта III, 1630, квітня 17, із Бару, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 239.

¹¹ С. Рудницький, *Українські козаки в 1625–30 рр. Критично-історичні розвідки*, Львів 1899, p. 50.

(where troops that belonged to the Ostrogski and Zasławski families were concentrated), encouraging them to participate in Koniecpolski's expedition was well underway when news of the uprising reached Warsaw.¹²

In Vasytkiv, Stanisław Potocki, castellan of Kamieniec, joined Samuel Łaszcz with his private banners and took command of the joined armed forces. Seeing the increase in the enemy forces, the Cossacks stopped harassing the Crown units and moved eastwards from Hambykiv to the Dnieper River to cross to the left bank. Potocki ordered his units to move in pursuit of the Cossacks.¹³

Soon the Hetman was joined by the castellan of Kamieniec, Stanisław Rewera Potocki, the starost of Kalush, Łukasz Żółkiewski, and their men.¹⁴ The units of the Voivode of Ruthenia Stanisław Lubomirski and the Deputy Chancellor of the Crown Tomasz Zamoyski had probably not yet arrived.¹⁵ Some of the registered Cossacks, about 1000–2000, remained loyal to the Commonwealth, while the rest either dispersed or joined the insurgents.¹⁶

Outstanding military pay

After the war with Sweden, the Commonwealth faced the great problem of paying the Crown army its military pay. In a letter to the king dated 7 November 1629, Koniecpolski described the state's debt to the soldiers in the following way: "Over two million is owed to the army, and there is not even three hundred thousand" in the state treasury.¹⁷

¹² *Універсал С. Конєцпольського до влади і лицарства Волинського воеводства, 1630, квітня 7, із Бару, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., pp. 236–237; Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського, 1630, квітня 13, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 237; Лист королівського секретаря Якуба Заджіка до Т. Замойського (фрагмент), 1630, квітня 16, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 238.*

¹³ *Повідомлення щоденника Владислава Халецького, товариша гусарської хоругви коронного війська (регести, фрагменти за 4 квітня – 8 червня 1630 р.)..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 222.*

¹⁴ *Лист С. Конєцпольського до Зигмунта III, 1630, квітня 17, із Бару, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 239.*

¹⁵ *Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського (фрагмент), 1630, травня 11, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 243.*

¹⁶ *Львівський літопис..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 302.*

¹⁷ *Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, sign. 365, p. 309.*

With the outbreak of the uprising, the problem of paying service pay to the Commonwealth's army became even worse. In his instructions to the local parliaments of 4 September, Sigismund III complained to the nobility that "we collect soldiers faster than money," and that it is "*fatale* to our Commonwealth: to begin every war, end no war without a sufficient war apparatus."¹⁸ Having realised that the state again unexpectedly desperately needed their services, the soldiers did not stop looting and were in no particular hurry to obey royal and Hetman's orders.

On 24 April, in the course of the expedition, "the army, in general, refused to continue service" and remained at Rzhyshchivka until 27 April, in the suburb of Stebliv, conducting negotiations with Koniecpolski.¹⁹ It seems that the Hetman nevertheless managed to convince his troops to continue the expedition with promises of generous pay to the army or even the distribution of certain 'hand-outs', i.e., bribes to the officers.

First disappointments of the mobilisation

After some clashes with the enemy, having crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper River, the Crown came to the town of Pereyaslav fortified by the Cossacks, where a hard four-week battle began on 7 May. The Cossacks surrounded the town with advanced Dutch-style field fortifications, and although on 8 May Koniecpolski managed to capture the insurgents' most advanced rampart, further assaults were not successful due to the inaccessibility of the enemy's fortifications and the small number of infantry.

We doubt that the mistakes made by the command of the Crown army at the beginning of the concentration of forces could be rectified in the later course of the military campaign.²⁰ Having set off with a small army deep into the country controlled by the insurgents, and deceived by the easy expulsion of the Zaporozhians from the right bank of the Dnieper River, Koniecpolski faced the impregnable fortifications of Pereyaslav.

¹⁸ Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, sign. 365, p. 272.

¹⁹ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кости-Збіроховського товариша козацької хоругви коронного війська (фрагменти за 18 листопада 1629 р. – 17 червня 1630 р.), [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 312.*

²⁰ *Стратегия в трудах военных классиков*, vol. 2, ed. А. СВЕЧИН, Москва 1926, p. 177.

However, he was aware of the precarious situation and for good reasons, too, as he later recalled during his speech at the General Sejm:

To cross the Dnieper River in such a small number as we were then, without infantry, without a cannon, was dangerous because the territory was also more suitable for infantry than for mounted troops, and with a handful of soldiers one did not know whether to fight the enemy or to guard the men who were arriving from behind the lines. On the other hand, one thought that if we did not cross the Dnieper now, it would be even more difficult to do so later, or nearly impossible, if the enemy was allowed to strengthen fortifications and obstruct all fords.²¹

Already the first skirmishes showed that the Field Hetman had insufficient forces to capture such powerful fortifications. The heavy battles of 16–17 May gave Konięcpolski much to consider about his further steps. As A. Kościa recalled, the commander of the Crown army was forced not only to abandon the idea of a quick victory over the rebels but even “had to entrench [his] camp set up near the enemy lines.”²²

Nowadays, it is very difficult to estimate – even approximately – the numbers of Crown troops, since no military records have survived from the campaign itself,²³ and the only mentions found in the available written sources are of a descriptive character.

Second phase of the mobilisation

The Field Hetman was hoping for reinforcements – additional troops that were already coming or could potentially arrive to his aid. According to a letter from one of the officials to T. Zamoyski, Jakub Butler’s regiment of German mercenaries was ravaging the Kraków Voivodship in winter and spring, while Podolia complained “about the ‘quarter’ army soldiers that harassed the subjects in the Sharhorod land,” to the extent that even “the peasants were

²¹ *Виступ С. Конецпольського на вальному сеймі (регести), [Б. д. – 1631, початок], [б. м. – Варшава], [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 190.*

²² *Анонімний лист про козацьке повстання..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 269.*

²³ Although, of course, detailed registers did exist. In particular, the King mentioned them in a letter to the ‘Prussian army’. *Vide:* Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, List Zygmunta III do skonfederowanego wojska pruskiego, z Warszawy, 15 VI 1630 r., sign. 365, p. 266.

fleeing.”²⁴ S. Kurosz, in a letter to his patron dated 29 April, stated: “The mercenaries do not want to go’ against the Cossacks, and because of the deficit of money and the delay in paying the military pay, a confederacy may start any moment, “for which there has already been a great deal of grumbling.”²⁵

The process of payment of the outstanding military pay and the return of the dragoons under the command of J. Butler and Ernest Denhoff to royal service was an ordeal. As late as April they received “a considerable part of the sum due in order to go to Ukraine” (although Stanisław Łubieński, Bishop of Płock and royal secretary, not without reason claimed that this army “had already taken their payment tenfold through debauchery and thievery”),²⁶ as evidenced by Sigismund III’s letter to the Hetman dated 1 May, in which the King wrote: “To the dragoons, who are already on their way, we have given our strict orders that they should hurry to Your Grace, nor delay anywhere at any stops, for which our bailiff will admonish them.”²⁷ The King’s letter of 22 May testifies that the dragoons, however, “do not want to leave until they have been paid in full,”²⁸ and of 24 May that “money was not sufficient for them to dispatch the regiment of the noble Buthler, which remains in its in posts.”²⁹ Finally, after they received the rest of their pay the drama with the dragoons was over and they joined S. Koniecpolski’s army. This happened, however, on 9 June,³⁰ i.e., the day after the peace agreement with the Cossacks was concluded.

It is not quite clear whether the royal peasant infantry troops (Polish: *piechota wybraniecka*), who had been decimated in the battles with the Swedes,

²⁴ Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (hereinafter: AGAD), Archiwum Zamoyskich, List niewiadomego do T. Zamoyskiego, z Zamościa, 20 IV 1630 r., sign. 930, p. 70.

²⁵ *Лист старости м. Орля Станіслава Куроша до польного гетьмана Великого князівства Литовського князя Кишиштофа II Радзивіла (фрагмент), 1630, квітня 29, з Орлі, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 82.*

²⁶ Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu, List S. Łubieńskiego do Zygmunta III, z Jablonny, 25 V 1630 r., sign. 157/2, k. 184v (another copy of the letter: Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, sign. 123, p. 145).

²⁷ *Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського (фрагмент), 1630, травня 1, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 242.*

²⁸ *Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського (фрагменти), 1630, травня 22, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 248.*

²⁹ Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, List Zygmunta III do Jerzego Zbaraskiego, kasztelana krakowskiego, z Warszawy, 24 V 1630 r., sign. 365, p. 166.

³⁰ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кости-Збіроховського..., [in:] Проект «Україна»..., p. 314.*

participated fully in the Pereyaslav campaign. Even at the beginning of the process of the army's concentration on 13 April, the King wrote to the Hetman: "It would seem to us that the royal peasant infantrymen from these lands, who are badly worn out, should be set free for this year so that they may be more suitable for a later war expedition."³¹

Another reference preserved in written records mentions certain master gunners who arrived in Warsaw before 22 May, and who, according to Sigismund III's instructions, having been given "some money, were ordered to leave" for Ukraine to join the Hetman. We doubt, however, that they would have managed to arrive in Pereyaslav before 8 June.³²

Significant support for the Crown army at Pereyaslav, as well as during the campaigns against the Cossacks in 1625 and the Tatars in 1629, was to be provided by the private troops of a number of magnates, 'Ukrainian lords,' who came to S. Koniecpolski's aid in 'great numbers.'³³ The Hetman's and King's chancelleries began sending letters to them with unexaggerated requests to 'save' HRH's army³⁴ soon after the Cossacks had captured Korsun.³⁵ A letter dated 11 May from Sigismund III to S. Koniecpolski lists some of the most important 'invitees' – Jerzy Zbaraski, castellan of Kraków, Adam Kazanowski, Voivode of Ruthenia, and Tomasz Zamoyski, Deputy Chancellor of the Crown.³⁶

We also know that, during the fighting at Pereyaslav, the troops of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski-Ostrogski, in the number of 600 soldiers, were hurrying to join the Field Hetman.³⁷ Near the town of Stayky, around

³¹ Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського, 1630, квітня 13, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 237.

³² Лист Зигмунта III до великого підканцлера коронного Хермолауса Лігензи, 1630, травня 21, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 247.

³³ Королівська інструкція на сеймики, [з Варшави], [перед 4 вересня 1630 р.], [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 291.

³⁴ Лист королівського секретаря Якуба Заджіка до Т. Замойського (фрагмент), 1630, квітня 16, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 239.

³⁵ *Vide:* for example, references to this in a letter from Sigismund III to S. Koniecpolski of 13 April: Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського, 1630, квітня 13, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 237.

³⁶ Лист Зигмунта III до С. Конєцпольського (фрагмент), 1630, травня 11, із Варшави, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 243.

³⁷ Лист С. Куроша до К. Радзивіла, 1630, червня 17, із Орлі, [in:] Проект «Україна»..., р. 266.

16–17 May, a battle took place at the ford on the left bank of the Dnieper River between the insurgents and the Zasławski-Ostrogski's army.

During the battle of Pereyaslav, the Cossacks insurgents captured an informant from whom they received precise information about the reinforcements that were going to Koniecpolski's aid, magnates' private armies, units of the Crown army, and artillery. From Pereyaslav the information of the arrival of enemy reinforcements was passed to the insurgents' commander colonel Fedir Korobka, who was in charge of supplies at the time,³⁸ and who immediately set off for the river ford. Two descriptions of the battle provide slightly different information, which, however, allow us to reconstruct the course of the fighting. According to S. Kurosz, the entire army of Zasławski-Ostrogski was defeated – “of which there were 600 soldiers” – and Colonel Stanisław “Trzecieski, their officer, was shot and captured.”³⁹ According to P. Bielecki's sources, the Cossacks “on the Dnieper River, in the wilderness, at the Stayky crossing, slaughtered 200 infantrymen and 100 Cossacks from Prince Zasławski's army, including a large number of barmaids and peddlers who went to the Crown camp with food and drink deliveries.”⁴⁰

After heavy fighting on 16–17 May, changes in tactics were made on the Polish side. In the *universals* sent out by the Field Hetman, Koniecpolski demanded the concentration of the troops and the arrival of the royal peasant infantry units, German infantry, and the magnate's troops as soon as possible.

On 19 and 20 May, S. Koniecpolski's dream of large reinforcements finally came true, since the whole army consisting of the private troops that belong to the Crown arrived at Pereyaslav together with the hetman's artillery which, however, “was in danger and under Cossack attack.”⁴¹ Apparently, the insurgents' watchmen, having destroyed the vanguard comprised of Zasławski-Ostrogski units, did not have enough strength remaining to beat the stronger approaching army made up of the combined magnate troops and parts of the Crown army, although probably there were some attempts to ‘rattle’ these troops. In addition to private units, the artillery could be defended by 12 banners of German infantry

³⁸ *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, pp. 252–253.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 252.

⁴¹ *Лист С. Куроша до К. Радзивіла, 1630, червня 17, із Орлі*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 266.

and dragoons under the command of Colonel Jakub Butler, and “with the same German infantry His Grace [Stanisław Lubomirski] the Voivode of Ruthenia’s 500 infantrymen” led by rittmeister Jan Żółtowski.⁴² On 19 May the Germans and their artillery reached Koniecpolski.

Following the artillery, by the morning of 20 May, a large regiment made up of Prince Zbaraski’s private army and Deputy Chancellor of the Crown Tomasz Zamoyski’s troops had arrived.⁴³ The number of Zbaraski’s units is difficult to determine. In 1617, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski ‘reportedly brought as many as 3000 men’ into the camp of the Crown army at the time of the threat from the Sublime Porte.⁴⁴ During the autumn campaign against the Cossacks in 1625, Koniecpolski was joined by a much less numerous force, “5 banners from Kraków.”⁴⁵ We suppose that the Zbaraski’s reinforcements at Pereyaslav in 1630 may have numbered between 500 and 1000 soldiers.

The exact number of T. Zamoyski’s private banners is also unknown.⁴⁶ In 1626, he dispatched 820 soldiers to Prussia, and in 1633, he sent 500 men to fight against the Turks.⁴⁷ It is possible that at Pereyaslav there were also at least half a thousand soldiers in the Deputy Chancellor’s units, which were led, among others, by Semen Bajbuza and Stefan Chmielecki’s son Łukasz.⁴⁸ It is possible that these magnates’ troops were also joined, as was the case in 1625, by other families’ numerous private banners (numbers according to data from 1625): Tyszkiewicz (5 banners), Korecki (3 banners), Potocki (5 banners), Nemiryecz, Bałaban, various infantry units (8), etc.⁴⁹ We suppose that the total number of troops was no less than 2000–3000, and possibly even as high as 5000–6000 soldiers. When assessing their quality, one should note that, as a rule, private

⁴² *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 253.

⁴³ *Статті прошивського сеймика (фрагмент), 1630, вересня 4, [Прошив],* [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 292.

⁴⁴ Z. ANUSIK, *Kasztelan krakowski Jerzy ks. Zbaraski (1574–1631): szkic do portretu antyregalisty*, “Przegląd Nauk Historycznych” 2010, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 64.

⁴⁵ Т. КОВАЛЕЦЬ, *Козацькі повстання 1625 та 1630 рр. в Україні за матеріалами діаріуша Анджея Кості-Збіроховського*, [in:] *Україна в Центрально-Східній Європі*, vol. 15, Київ 2015, p. 376.

⁴⁶ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кості-Збіроховського...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 312.

⁴⁷ R. SIKORA, *Wojskowość polska w dobie wojny polsko-szwedzkiej 1626–1629. Kryzys mocarstwa*, Poznań 2005, p. 59.

⁴⁸ *Лист Війська Запорозького та гетьмана Антона Бута до С. Конєцпольського...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 256.

⁴⁹ According to A. Kościa-Zbirohowski, *vide*: Т. КОВАЛЕЦЬ, *Козацькі повстання...*, pp. 375–376.

troops also received higher service pay and were better equipped than soldiers of the ‘quarter’ army banners.⁵⁰

By 19–20 May the concentration of the Crown forces at Pereyaslav was more or less completed, as the vast majority of the ‘magnate’ troops that Koniecpolski had counted on had arrived at that gathering point. Bielecki soon recalled that “the Ukrainian lords with their troops are with His Grace the Hetman in the camp; only Prince Wiśniowiecki and his men have not arrived, and food of all sorts is going to the Cossack forces from his Ukrainian estates, for which His Grace the Hetman is very sorry.”⁵¹

The climax of the Battle of Pereyaslav took place on 25 May, when the insurgents stormed the enemy’s positions throughout the day, seized one of the entrenchments and were close to capturing the main Crown camp, inflicting huge losses on Polish units.

The Cossacks seized some artillery from the captured entrenchment, which sources describe in various ways (“2 cannons and 2 arquebuses;”⁵² “one demolition cannon, a *falconet* (field cannon), and a light cannon (*smigownica*);”⁵³ “they took the 3 largest cannons and 2 arquebuses”⁵⁴).⁵⁵ The large calibre artillery, too heavy to be removed by the Cossack troops, would be clogged with nails, after which it required lengthy repair.

Final chords of the mobilisation

At the end of May and the beginning of June, separate detachments of Crown and, interestingly, also Lithuanian forces were still approaching Pereyaslav. However, they were often successfully intercepted and destroyed by the insurgents.

⁵⁰ A. BOROWIAK, *Powstanie kozackie 1638*, Zabrze 2010, p. 108.

⁵¹ *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 254.

⁵² *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кості-Збіроховського...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 313.

⁵³ *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 253.

⁵⁴ *Львівський літопис...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 200.

⁵⁵ It is interesting that the surrendering of the seized artillery did not take place immediately after the peace agreement but continued until the council of the Zaporozhian Host in Cherkasy in July 1630. *Vide*: *Лист П. Белецького до Я.-С. Сапєги (регести), 1630, серпня 26, із Варшави*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 148.

Major clashes occurred, for example, in the town of Dymer, 35 km north of Kyiv. According to Bielecki, a larger unit of Cossack scouts stayed here together with the townspeople. The insurgents first “took the wagons of Master Cetner’s banner, having killed all the company and servants,” and then attacked the Crown reinforcements in the form of certain banners under the command of “Master Tryzna from Lithuania” and Master Onichowski. (Interestingly, during the recent Polish-Swedish war, rittmeister Pawel Piotr Tryzna had commanded a Lithuanian infantry banner with 400 soldiers.) The rittmeister himself was shot and “escaped to Kyiv only with a third of the banner;” Onichowski and 20 comrades from his banner were killed.

“After the Pentecost on Friday,” i.e., on 1 June, the same insurgents in the number of “several hundred men” moved south, harassing the soldiers. In the town of Białogrodzia, they “took wagons from 4 Prussian army banners,” and also “beat up all the company and servants that accompanied the wagons.”⁵⁶ In Bilhorodka, the insurgents reportedly managed to seize around 600 horses of the Crown army. During the above-described battles, the Cossacks also used various deceptions, including dressing up as Crown soldiers.⁵⁷ On 2 June, a certain banner under the command of ‘Master Olizar’ [Ludwik Olizar-Włóczkiewicz] reached the camp.⁵⁸

Troops of the imperial army, who had already received part of their outstanding pay, were also on the way. On 3 June, Cossacks near Kyiv “burned 50 baidaks and numerous dinghies, so that the Poles would not have anything with which to cross to this side to the hetman.” At this time, imperial troops arrived and several days of clashes between the ‘Germans’ and the Cossacks began near Kyiv. Their main object of interest was the Orthodox monasteries and their riches.

First, the imperial infantry stormed the Pechersk Lavra monastery, having plundered the nearby town. Then they allegedly plundered the Desert St. Nicholas Monastery and the Jordan Monastery; they tried to storm the Mezhyhirya Monastery, but were unsuccessful.⁵⁹ These reinforcements managed to cross the

⁵⁶ *Реляція невідомого про події козацького повстання...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 254.

⁵⁷ *Львівський літопис...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 201.

⁵⁸ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кості-Збіроховського...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 313.

⁵⁹ *Львівський літопис...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 202.

Dnieper River only on 9 June, after the campaign had already ended.⁶⁰ The author of the Lviv chronicle thus described the change in the situation: The Cossacks “besieged the Poles from all sides so that they could no longer do anything, like the rich man with Lazarus. A camp is a camp, while numerous regiments roam all over Ukraine.”⁶¹

The Zaporozhian Host soon began to gain strategic advantage and Koniecpolski, faced with the prospect of defeat and, for that matter, rebellion among the Crown soldiers, found himself in a no-win situation. He was forced to initiate negotiations with the Cossacks, which proved very useful for the Polish side, as the conflict was in fact settled at the price of minor concessions.

Conclusions

By the end of the Battle of Pereyaslav, the command of the Commonwealth army had forces of 10 000 soldiers (or even exceeding that number). These forces were sufficient in terms of quality and numbers to attempt to hold back the main body of the insurgents' army in one place, but too small to carry out gruelling combat in an open field. The very difficult mobilisation of units was precisely the reason why the 1630 campaign ended in failure for the Polish side.

We completely agree with the conclusion of the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Antonowycz that “the execution of the Polish mobilisation plan has all the characteristics of being a somewhat unfinished, impulsive, not to say chaotic business.”⁶² On the other hand, this chaotic mobilisation was due to Stanisław Koniecpolski's initial strategic intention aimed at a quick and decisive offensive.

⁶⁰ *Повідомлення щоденника Анджея Кості-Збіроховського...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 314.

⁶¹ *Львівський літопис...*, [in:] *Проект «Україна»...*, p. 201.

⁶² М. АНТОНОВИЧ, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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Taras Kovalets

MOBILIZACJA WOJSK RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ OBOJGA NARODÓW PRZED BITWĄ POD PEREJASŁAWIEM W 1630 ROKU

Streszczenie. W artykule przedstawiony został zarys działań mobilizacyjnych poczynionych przez kancelarię królewską i hetmańską, których celem była koncentracja maksymalnych sił zbrojnych wojsk koronnych dla stłumienia powstania wojska zaporoskiego pod dowództwem Tarasa Fedorowicza i Antona Buta. Omówiono poszczególne aspekty mobilizacji, takie jak metodyka jej przeprowadzenia w odniesieniu do jednostek wojska kwarcianego, cudzoziemskiego, chorągwi prywatnych, odrębnych chorągwi wojska litewskiego oraz tych resztek zaporoskiego, które pozostały wierne Rzeczypospolitej.

Na podstawie różnorodnych źródeł opublikowanych oraz archiwalnych (regestrów opłat wojska, listów oficjalnych i prywatnych, tekstów narracyjnych itd.) ustalono, o ile to było możliwe, geografię i chronologię przemieszczania się jednostek wojsk Rzeczypospolitej podczas owej mobilizacji, ich skład, liczebność oraz imiona dowódców.

Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na dotychczas mało zbadane przez historyków aspekty mobilizacji chorągwi prywatnych miejscowych magnatów Zbaraskich, Zaslawskich-Ostrogskich, Zamoy-skich, które w bliskiej przyszłości zaczęły stanowić znaczne wsparcie dla wojska kwarcianego. Omówiono także początek długiej i trudnej mobilizacji chorągwi regimentu cudzoziemskiego pod dowództwem Jakuba Butlera i braci Denhoffów oraz przygotowanie do kampanii artylerii koronnej.

Przeprowadzone badania pomogły z pewnością stwierdzić, że po pierwszych fazach mobilizacji przed bitwą pod Perejasławiem hetman polny koronny Stanisław Koniecpolski dysponował siłami wystarczającymi pod względem jakości i liczebności do powstrzymania głównej części wojska powstańców w jednym miejscu oraz prób nawiązania z przeciwnikiem wyczerpujących walk na otwartym terenie.

Słowa kluczowe: powstanie kozackie 1630 r., wojsko zaporoskie, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, Stanisław Koniecpolski, Taras Fedorowicz, mobilizacja

Тарас Ковалець

МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ ВОЙСКА РЕЧИ ПОСПОЛИТОЙ ПЕРЕД ПЕРЕЯСЛАВСКОЙ БИТВОЙ 1630 ГОДА

Аннотация. В статье представлен очерк мобилизационных мероприятий, предпринятых королевской и гетманской канцеляриями, целью которых было сосредоточение максимальных сил коронного войска для подавления восстания Войска Запорожского под командованием Тараса Федоровича и Антона Бута. Были обсуждены отдельные аспекты мобилизации, такие как методика ее проведения в отношении частей кварцяного войска, иноземных войск, частных хоругвей, отдельных хоругвей литовского войска и тех остатков Войска Запорожского, которые остались верны Речи Посполитой. На основании различных опубликованных и архивных источников (реестров выплаты жалования, официальных и частных писем, повествовательных текстов и др.) были установлены, насколько это возможно, география и хронология передвижений частей польского войска в период мобилизации, его состав, численность и имена командиров. Особое внимание было уделено аспектам мобилизации частных хоругвей местных магнатов Збаржских, Заславских-Острожских и Замойских, которые в ближайшем будущем стали значительной опорой кварцяного войска. Обсуждается также начало долгой и трудной мобилизации компаний иноземного регимента под командованием Якуба Батлера и братьев Денхофф, а также подготовка к кампании коронной артиллерии. Проведенное исследование также помогло сделать вывод, что после первых этапов мобилизации перед битвой под Переяславом полевой коронный гетман Станислав Конецпольский имел достаточно сил с точки зрения качества и численности, чтобы остановить основную часть армии повстанцев на одном месте и попытаться вступить с противником в изнурительные бои на открытой местности.

Ключевые слова: казачье восстание 1630 г., Войско Запорожское, Речь Посполитая, Станислав Конецпольский, Тарас Федорович, мобилизация